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Abstract
This paper studies the market and welfare eects of two main tax reforms { the
Corporate Business Income Tax (CBIT) and the Allowance for Corporate Equity
tax (ACE). Using an imperfect-competition model for a small open economy, it
is shown that the well-known neutrality property of ACE does not hold. Both
corporate tax regimes distort market entry and equilibrium prices. A main result is
that a small open economy should levy a positive source tax on capital in markets
with free rm entry. Which tax system is better from a welfare point of view,
depends on production technology, the competitive eects of ACE and CBIT, and
whether entry is excessive or suboptimal at the given corporate tax rate. Imposing
tax income neutrality yields a higher corporate tax rate with ACE, which increases
the scope for CBIT to be welfare improving.
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1 Introduction
Imperfect competition is widespread in markets yet the literature on corporate taxation
and imperfect competition is scant. This paper sets up an imperfect-competition model
of a small open economy and studies the market and welfare eects of the two most
favored candidates for a (fundamental) corporate tax reform, the Corporate Business
Income Tax (CBIT) and the Allowance for Corporate Equity tax (ACE).1 Under an ACE
tax, the current deductibility of actual interest payments is maintained, but the system
adds to this a notional return on equity to be deductible against corporate prots. In
contrast, under a CBIT tax, rms cannot deduct interest payments at all. Corporate tax
reform under either of these two schemes have in common that they lead to neutrality
between debt and equity nance, but the tax base is narrower under an ACE tax due to
the allowance for equity.
We nd that that the benchmark result in the optimal tax literature that a small
open economy should not levy any source-based taxes on capital,2 is no longer valid
under imperfect competition. The reason is that the corporate tax rate plays a key role
in regulating competition (avoiding socially excessive market entry). When the number
of rms is xed, we show that the ACE tax is equal to a lump-sum tax in that it
does not distort prices. This results has a parallel to Boadway and Bruce (1984) who
pointed out that the ACE tax works like a lump-sum tax, since it osets the investment
distortions caused by deviations between true economic depreciation and depreciation for
tax purposes. With free entry of rms the price neutrality under ACE taxation vanishes
and both ACE and CBIT tax systems distort the market equilibrium.
Which tax system is better from a welfare point of view (ACE or CBIT) depends
on assumptions about production technology, entry of rms, and the level of taxation.
Under both systems, the optimal corporate tax rate is positive in order to reduce ex-
cessive entry. Though consumer prices are always lower under an ACE system, a CBIT
system promotes less entry under increasing returns to scale. The reason is that CBIT
avoids a subsidy on average capital costs, which under increasing returns to scale would
overcompensate the intensied strategic price competition driven by the marginal-cost
eect. These results are reversed under decreasing returns to scale. Empirical evidence
points to that multinationals operate under increasing returns to scale (e.g., Carr et al.,
2001; Antweiler and Treer, 2002) suggesting that the ACE system leads to more entry
and excessive competition.
These results are obtained by using the Salop model (Salop, 1979), which considers
price competition with dierentiated products in an imperfectly competitive market.
1The `Swedish Committee on Corporate Taxation', an advisory committee to the Swedish government,
proposed in June 2014 that Sweden should implement the CBIT system of taxation (see SOU2014:40).
Belgium and Italy have recently implemented variants of the ACE tax into their tax systems.
2See, e.g., Gordon (1986).
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Firms pay a xed cost to enter the market and choose the set of product characteristics
to oer to consumers on the Salop circle. Since products are horizontally dierentiated
and consumers have a preferred variety, each rm has some market power relatively to
competitors. The Salop model has the crucial property that prices and prot margins are
aected by entry. Hence, strategic interactions between rms are central to the model.
These features allows us to determine whether the free-entry equilibrium has too much,
or too little variety, relative to the social optimum.
An alternative model to the Salop model would be the Dixit and Sitglitz (1977)
monopolistic competition model. A weakness of this model is that it does not consider
strategic interactions between rms, since rm's prices are always a constant mark-up over
marginal costs. Consequently, changes in tax rates do not change rms' price strategies
since the adjustment comes via the number of rms in the market. In the Dixit-Stiglitz
model taxes reduce rm's prot and induces some rms to exit the market, but taxes
do not aect market prices (they remain constant). These limiting features of the Dixit-
Stiglitz model makes it a less obvious candidate for our analysis, especially since our focus
is on the strategic interaction between rms.
1.1 Related literature
The comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) and the allowance for corporate equity
(ACE) have recently gained interest in European policy debates as a way of restructuring
corporate tax due to perceived losses in welfare that follows from current corporate tax
systems. Most countries allow for a deduction of debt interest when computing the prot
tax base, but disallow equity to deduct its opportunity cost. Debt nance, therefore, is
at an advantage compared to nancing an investment via retained earnings or equity.
This may lead to too much debt, too high risk premiums being paid, or moral hazard
problems (excessive risk taking or suboptimal investments; see, e.g., Myers, 1977). In
order to avoid such problems and to equalize the opportunity cost of debt and equity,
CBIT and ACE taxation came into being.3
CBIT was developed by the US Treasury Department at the beginning of the nineties
(see US Department of Treasury, 1992), whereas the ACE was elaborated by the IFS
Capital Taxes Group (see Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1991). The CBIT makes the
corporation tax neutral towards the nancing structure by disallowing the exemption
of interest paid for corporate income tax purposes. ACE obtains the same result by
granting equity holders an allowance equal to a notional risk-free return on equity (e.g.,
the market interest rate for long-term government bonds). Neither the comprehensive
business income tax nor the allowance for corporate equity distort the liability side of
3A recent proponent for nancing neutrality is the Mirrlees Report; see Mirrlees et al. (2011), par-
ticularly chapter 17.
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corporations. One key dierence between the two systems is that CBIT has a wider
tax base (since interest expenses are non-deductible), but distorts marginal investment
decisions compared to ACE.
Previous studies of these two tax systems have been undertaken in a perfectly com-
petitive setting. Radulescu and Stimmelmayr (2007) compare ACE and CBIT using
computable general equilibrium (CGE). They show that welfare is higher under an ACE
type of reform even if the loss of tax revenue is nanced by an increase in the VAT. De
Mooij and Devereux (2011) use an applied general equilibrium model for the EU cali-
brated with recent empirical estimates of elasticities to study a balanced budget reform.
They focus on investment and prot shifting incentives following a tax reform and nd
that most European countries would benet from a unilateral CBIT type of reform. A
coordinated tax reform within the EU, however, would work in favor of an ACE reform.
Keuschnigg and Ribi (2013) use a model of competitive markets and show that if rms
are cash-constrained, an ACE tax will aect investment decisions. However, the ACE
tax still remains less distortive than a CBIT system. Kothenburger and Stimmelmayr
(2014) study how agency problems (such as empire building) are aected by systems of
corporate taxation. They nd that, depending on how severe the internal agency problem
is and to which extent it can be mitigated by external (bank) monitoring, nancing cost
allowances (such as an ACE tax) may hamper welfare.
The model used in this paper is the circular city model of Salop, and in the subsequent
sections, we set up the model and analyze the equilibrium with and without free entry
of rms. In the nal section of the paper, a welfare comparison of the two tax systems is
undertaken.
2 Model
Consider a market with n  2 rms symmetrically located on a (Salop) circle with
circumference equal to 1. Each rm oers a product at price pi, i = 1; :::; n. There is
a continuum of consumers uniformly located on the circle with total mass normalized
to one. Each consumer buys one or zero units of the product. The utility to consumer
located at x 2 [0; 1] of buying product i is given by
ui = v   di + ; (1)
where v is the gross utility of consuming the product (reservation price),  is the transport
cost per unit of distance, di = jzi   xj is the distance to rm i's location zi 2 [0; 1] ; and
 is a numeraire good. Distance is, as usual, interpreted either in physical or product
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space.4
Each consumer has income m = r+ w, where r is capital income, with r denoting
the interest rate and  the capital endowment, and w is non-capital (e.g., labor) income.
We assume a small, open economy, which implies that r is exogenous and the rms'
demand for capital is not constrained by the domestic capital endowment. Normalizing
the price of the numeraire good to unity, and inserting the budget constraint into (1), we
can write the net utility of consumer x as follows
ui = v   di   pi +m: (2)
We assume v is suciently large, so that all consumers buy one unit of the product
from the most preferred rm (full market coverage). The consumer that is indierent
between buying from rm i and rm i+ 1 is located at
bx+ = 1
2
[ (zi+1 + zi)  pi + pi+1] ;
whereas the consumer indierent between buying from rm i and rm i  1 is located at
bx  = 1
2
[ (zi + zi 1) + pi   pi 1] :
Firm i's demand is then given by
yi =
Z bx+
bx  dx =
1
n
  2pi   pi 1   pi+1
2
: (3)
The rms have identical technology. For simplicity, we assume capital is the only
input in production and dene the relationship between capital and production by the
following inverse production function ki = g (yi).
5 The inverse production function g (:)
is assumed to be continuous and twice dierentiable, where g (0) = 0 and g0 (:) > 0.
We allow for technology to exhibit dierent scale properties. A constant returns to scale
(CRS) technology implies constant marginal productivity of capital, g00 = 0, and marginal
capital costs equal to average capital costs, g0 = g=y. Decreasing returns to scale (DRS)
technology implies decreasing marginal productivity of capital, g00 > 0, and marginal
capital costs exceeding average capital costs, g0 > g=y, whereas the opposite is true for
an increasing returns to scale (IRS) technology.6
4In the latter case,  is often referred to as the mismatch cost measuring the cost related to the
distance between the consumer's most preferred product (dened by the consumer's location x) and the
products oered in the market (dened by the rm location z).
5This production function can be generalized to encompass non-capital inputs (labor) when these
inputs are used either in xed proportions with or independently of capital.
6To see this more clearly, consider the production function y = f (k) = k1=, where  > 0. Clearly, if
 = 1, technology is CRS with constant marginal productivity of capital, whereas if  < (>) 1, technol-
ogy is IRS (DRS) with increasing (decreasing) marginal capital productivity. Inverting the production
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We assume a perfectly competitive capital market and, for simplicity, that neither
equity nor debt are risky. This implies that the interest rates of debt and equity must
be equalized in a capital market equilibrium. Thus, rms are indierent between raising
capital through debt or equity and the cost of capital is given by the interest rate in the
capital market. Firm i's gross (before-tax) prots can be expressed by
i = piyi   rg (yi)  f; (4)
where piyi is sales revenues, r is the interest rate, rg (yi) is capital costs, and f > 0 is
xed set-up (entry) costs assumed without loss of generality to be identical across rms.7
The corporate tax scheme is set by the government. We will consider two dierent
regimes: (i) Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) and (ii) Allowance for Cor-
porate Equity (ACE). The two regimes dier according to whether they allow for tax
deduction of capital costs. While ACE allows for tax deductions of both debt and equity,
CBIT does not allow for any tax deductions of capital costs. Firm i's after-tax prots
are given by
i = (1  t) piyi   r (1  t) g (yi)  f; (5)
where t 2 [0; 1) is the corporate tax rate and  2 [0; 1] is the share of the capital costs
that are tax deductible by the rms. Note that the term (1  t) is the dierence between
true costs and tax deductible capital costs.  = 0 corresponds to a pure CBIT scheme
with no tax deductions for capital costs, whereas  = 1 mimics an ACE-system with tax
deductibility for all capital costs.
We consider the following timing structure. At stage 1, the tax authority decides
on the corporate tax rate and the tax deductions for capital costs. At stage 2, the
rms simultaneously decide to enter the market. Entry takes place as long as expected
operating prots exceed the xed (sunk) entry cost. Finally, at stage 3, the rms that
entered the market compete in prices a la Bertrand. The game is as usual solved by
backward induction.
function above, we get k = g (y) = y, where
g0 = y 1, g00 =  (   1) y 2, and g0   g=y = y 1 (   1) :
Thus, a CRS technology ( = 1) implies g00 = 0 and g0 = g=y, a DRS technology ( > 1) implies g00 > 0
and g0 > g=y, and an IRS technology ( < 1) implies g00 < 0 and g0 < g=y.
7Allowing for dierent xed costs would imply that only rms with suciently low xed costs would
enter. However, since the xed costs do not inuence the price decisions directly, but only entry decision,
our results would be robust to such a generalization.
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3 Price equilibrium
Given that n  2 rms have entered the market, each rm sets the price in order to
maximize prots taking the other rms' prices as given. The prot-maximizing price of
rm i is given by the following rst-order condition:8
@i
@pi
= (1  t)

pi
@yi
@pi
+ yi

  r (1  t) g0 (yi) @yi
@pi
= 0; (6)
where @yi=@pi =  1= from equation (3).
Imposing symmetry, i.e., pi = pi 1 = pi+1 = p for all i = 1; :::; n, and solving (6) for
p, we get the following candidate for a symmetric Nash price equilibrium
p =

n
+ rg0(yi)

1  t
1  t

: (7)
The last term can be interpreted as the (eective) marginal capital costs, which is in-
creasing in the corporate tax rate, but decreasing in the level of tax deductions. Inserting
(7) into (5), we get the following equilibrium after-tax prots
 = (1  t) 
n2
+ r (1  t)

g0
1
n
  g

  f: (8)
From these expressions, we can establish the following:
Lemma 1 The price equilibrium in (7) exists and is unique if and only if  > max f1; 2g,
where
1 =  r
2
1  t
1  t g
00 (9)
ensures that the prot function is strictly concave, and
2 =
n2
1  t

r (1  t)

g   g0 1
n

+ f

(10)
ensures that each rm's equilibrium after-tax prots are non-negative.
All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
The eects of corporate taxation follow from (7);
@p
@t
= rg0
1  
(1  t)2  0; (11)
8The second-order condition requires
@2i
@p2i
=  1


2 (1  t) + r (1  t) g00 1


< 0:
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@p
@
=  rg0 t
1  t < 0; (12)
which allows us to state:
Proposition 1 In a Salop model with a xed number of rms,
(i) a higher corporate tax rate increases product prices for incomplete capital cost de-
ductions ( < 1). Only if complete tax deductions for capital costs are allowed
( = 1), the corporate tax has no distortionary price eects.
(ii) a higher level of tax deduction for capital costs () always reduces product prices.
If the tax authority introduces CBIT in its pure form with no tax deductions ( = 0)
or only allows for limited deductions of capital costs ( < 1), we obtain the standard
result that the corporate tax distorts rm behavior and thus product prices. The eect
of corporate taxation on product prices can be decomposed into a direct and a strategic
eect. The direct eect is that the corporate tax increases the (eective) marginal cost
of capital, which in turn shifts up the product prices.9 The strategic eect is due to
prices being strategic complements and reinforces the direct eect of corporate taxation
on product prices.10 Thus, corporate taxation has a stronger (positive) impact on product
prices in markets with imperfect price competition than in markets without any strategic
interaction between rms.
Under an ACE tax scheme with complete tax deductions for capital costs ( = 1), the
corporate tax does not distort product prices. The reason is that when all capital costs
can be deducted from the tax base, then corporate taxation is equivalent to a lump-sum
prot tax. Consequently, the corporate tax will not have any impact on the rms' pricing
decisions. This is in line with the neutrality properties that has been attributed to the
ACE system.11 As will be clear later, this result is only true when the number of rms
in the market is xed.
What are the eects of corporate taxation and the tax deduction scheme on rm
protability? Dierentiating (8) with respect to t and , and using the equilibrium
conditions (9)-(10), yields
@
@t
=   
n2
  r

g0
1
n
  g

< 0; (13)
9Alternatively, we can think of a higher corporate tax rate as a reduction of rms' marginal revenues,
which induces the rms to increase their prices in order to balance marginal revenues and marginal cost.
10The individual rm response to corporate taxation is obtained by dierentiating (6) with respect to
t yielding:
@pi
@t
=
yi   1 (pi + rg0)
1

 
2 (1  t) + r (1  t) 1 g00
 :
11See, e.g., Boadway and Bruce (1984).
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@
@
=  rt

g0
1
n
  g

? 0: (14)
Based on these expressions, we get the following results:
Proposition 2 In a Salop model with a xed number of rms,
(i) a higher corporate tax rate always reduces rms' after-tax prots. Under CBIT
( = 0), prots always fall independently of production technology. If capital cost
deductions are allowed ( > 0), then the negative eect on rm's prot is stronger
under DRS technology and weaker under IRS technology.
(ii) a higher level of tax deduction for capital costs increases (reduces) rms' after-
tax prots if the technology is IRS (DRS), but has no eect on after-tax prots if
technology is CRS.
Proposition 2 makes it clear that a higher corporate tax rate reduces rms' after-tax
prots. The reason is that the rms cannot shift the full burden of the corporate tax
onto consumers. A higher corporate tax rate increases the price to consumers, but the
rise is not sucient to recover the loss in prot from the corporate tax payment. The fall
in prot holds for any production technology (IRS, DRS or CRS).
If the tax authority disallows tax deductions of capital costs, as under CBIT ( = 0),
then from (13) we see that the production technology does not play a role for the eect
of the corporate tax on rms' prots. If tax deductions are allowed ( > 0), the technol-
ogy relating capital and production matters. More precisely, the higher (lower) are the
marginal capital costs relative to the average capital costs, the stronger (weaker) is the
negative impact of corporate taxation on rms' after-tax prots. In other words, corpo-
rate taxation is particularly harmful to rms' prots when the tax authority allows for
tax deductions and production involves DRS. However, if technology involves IRS, then
the negative eect on prots of corporate taxation is partly mitigated by the reduction
in capital costs due to tax deductions.
To see why scale in production matters for prot, it is useful to decompose the eect
of the corporate tax into three separate eects; (i) a loss in sales revenues ( tpy); (ii)
an increase in prices (@p=@t) (1  t) y; and (iii) a reduction in capital costs (rg (y))
due to tax deductions. The two rst eects depend on the size of the marginal cost of
capital (scaled with the production level), whereas the latter eect depends on the total
capital costs. Thus, the smaller the marginal costs are relative to the average costs, the
stronger is the capital cost gain from tax deductions.
The eect of tax deductions of capital costs on rms' after-tax prots crucially hinges
on the production technology, as shown in Proposition 2. Surprisingly, a higher level of
tax deductions may result in lower after-tax prots to the rms if the technology is DRS.
To understand this result, we can decompose the total eect of the tax deduction into
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two separate eects: (i) a prot loss due to lower prices, (1  t) y (@p=@), and (ii) a
prot gain due to lower capital costs, (rt) g (:). The latter eect is the direct tax saving
eect of the tax deduction, whereas the former eect is a strategic eect due to price
competition. If the technology is CRS, these two eects cancel each other, and the net
eect of tax deductions is zero and the choice of ACE versus CBIT does not matter for
rms' protability. On the other hand, if the technology is IRS, the direct eect (capital
cost gain) dominates, and the net eect of tax deductions on prots is positive. Thus, a
ACE scheme would be more benecial to the rms than CBIT. If the technology is DRS,
however, the strategic (price) eect dominates, and the eect of tax deductions on prots
is negative, suggesting that CBIT is more benecial to rms than ACE.
4 Free entry equilibrium
We now consider stage 2 where n  2 rms simultaneously decide whether or not to enter
the market. Each rm i enters the market if the expected prots exceed the xed (sunk)
entry cost f > 0. Firms enter the market until the equilibrium after-tax prots equal
zero (up to the integer problem); hence, the equilibrium number of rms n (t; ; ; f; r)
is given by
 = (1  t) 
(n)2
+ r (1  t)

g0
1
n
  g

  f = 0: (15)
How do the corporate tax and tax deductions aect the number of rms in the market?
The answer to this question follows qualitatively from the results in Proposition 2. Quan-
titatively, by applying the implicit function theorem on (15), and using the equilibrium
conditions (9)-(10), we obtain the following tax eects on the number of rms
@n
@t
=   (n)3

(n)2 + r
 
g0 1
n   g

(1  t) 2 + r (1  t) g00 < 0; (16)
@n
@
=   (n)3 rt
 
g0 1
n   g

(1  t) 2 + r (1  t) g00 ? 0: (17)
Based on these expressions, we get the following results:
Proposition 3 In a Salop model with free entry,
(i) a higher corporate tax rate always reduces the number of rms in the market, irre-
spective of technology and tax deduction scheme (ACE or CBIT);
(ii) a higher level of tax deductions of capital costs increases (reduces) the number of
rms in the market when technology is IRS (DRS), but has no eect when technology
is CRS.
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As expected, Proposition 3 shows that corporate taxation always reduces rm entry
and therefore the intensity of competition in the market. The magnitude of this eect
depends on the scale properties and whether tax deductions for capital costs are allowed
or not. More interesting, Proposition 3 shows that the eect of tax deductions crucially
relies on the production technology. If technology is CRS, then tax deductions have
no impact on market entry, and the choice of ACE or CBIT has no competitive eect.
However, if technology is DRS, then allowing for tax deductions reduces the number of
rms in the market, which means that CBIT would be more pro-competitive than ACE.
The opposite is true when technology is IRS. To understand this result, note that tax
deductions have two opposing eects on prots. On one hand, tax deductions directly
increases prots, all else equal. On the other hand, tax deductions shift down prices and
thus prot margins, which reduces prots. Proposition 3 shows that the latter eect is
stronger than the direct eect when technology is DRS, whereas with CRS the two eects
exactly cancel out.
What are the tax eects on product prices in a market with free entry of rms? Taking
the partial derivative of (7) with respect to t and , and imposing the equilibrium level
of rms n (t; ; ; r; f) given by (15), we get the following (implicit) comparative static
results
@p
@t
= rg0
1  
(1  t)2  
1
n2

 + r
1  t
1  t g
00

@n
@t
> 0; (18)
@p
@
=  rg0

t
1  t

  1
n2

 + r
1  t
1  t g
00

@n
@
< 0: (19)
Based on these expressions, we get the following results:
Proposition 4 In a Salop model with free entry,
(i) a higher corporate tax rate always leads to higher product prices, irrespectively of
technology and tax deduction scheme (ACE or CBIT);
(ii) a higher level of tax deductions of capital costs always reduces product prices irre-
spective of technology.
When accounting for entry, corporate taxation always leads to higher prices in the
product market, even with ACE and complete tax deduction of capital costs ( = 1).
The reason is that corporate taxation has both a direct eect on prices (as shown in
Proposition 1) and an indirect eect through the change in entry and thus competition
intensity. In equation (18), these two eects are captured by the rst and second term,
respectively. While ACE eliminates the direct distortionary eect on rms' pricing, the
indirect eect through competition prevails. Since rms' after-tax prots are inevitably
aected by corporate taxation, intensity of competition will be reduced. Thus, corporate
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taxation has distortionary eects on product prices irrespective of whether ACE or CBIT
is introduced.
The indirect eect of corporate taxation, as given by the second term in (18), consists
of two elements; (i) a standard competition eect (=n2), and (ii) a capital cost eect
(rg00 (1  t) = (1  t)). With a CRS technology, the cost eect vanish, whereas with an
IRS (a DRS) technology the cost eect strengthen (dampen) the competition eect on
prices.
Tax deductions of capital costs always reduces product prices, even when accounting
for entry. We know from Proposition 1 that tax deductions reduce product prices for
a given number of rms. However, as shown in Proposition 3, the competition eects
of tax deductions are ambiguous and depend on the production technology. Indeed, if
technology exhibits DRS, then higher levels of tax deductions reduce entry and shift up
product prices. However, we nd that this potentially countervailing competition eect
only partially mitigates the direct eect, and that tax deductions always lead to lower
product prices.
Based on the previous results, we may sum up the ndings related to the choice of
the tax deduction regime in the following way:
Corollary 1 In a Salop model with free entry,
(i) CBIT (ACE) promotes more entry of rms when technology exhibits DRS (IRS);
(ii) both ACE and CBIT distort product prices, but ACE induces lower product prices
than CBIT, irrespective of technology.
5 Social welfare and corporate taxation
Social welfare, assuming a utilitarian (unweighted) welfare function, is given by the sum
of consumers' surplus, producers' prots, and (in this setting) the corporate tax income,
i.e.,
W = CS ++ T: (20)
CS represents the consumers' surplus given by
CS =
nX
i=1
Z bxi+1
bxi 1 (v   di   pi +m) dx; (21)
 is the producers' prots given by
 =
Xn
i=1
i =
Xn
i=1
[(1  t) piyi   r (1  t) g (yi)  f ] ; (22)
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and T is the corporate tax income given by
T =
nX
i=1
[tpiyi   rtg (yi)] : (23)
Using this specication of social welfare, we derive the rst-best outcome, as a bench-
mark. After that, we study the tax authority's optimal choice of corporate taxation and
deductions (ACE or CBIT), and the corresponding eects on entry and pricing in the
product market. Finally, we analyze the welfare properties of ACE and CBIT under tax
income neutrality, i.e., the two schemes have to generate the same tax income level.
5.1 First-best outcome
Consider a social planner that directly decides the number of rms and their production
levels using the available technology. Since rms are symmetric, the rst-best outcome
implies that each rm produces 1=n units of the product. Inserting (21)-(23) into and
imposing symmetry, the social welfare function in (20) simplies to
W fb = m+ v   
2n
  nrg (y)  nf; (24)
where the rst three terms are the (gross) consumers' surplus, and the two last terms are
the capital costs and the xed costs of setting up n rms.
The social planner chooses the number of rms that maximizes social welfare in (24),
yielding12
@W fb
@n
=

2 (nfb)2
+ r

g0
1
nfb
  g

  f = 0; (25)
where nfb (; r; f) is the rst-best number of rms in the market. The rst term of (25)
is the social marginal benet of a new rm due to the reduction in transport costs,
the second term measures the net welfare eect of technology (i.e., returns to scale) on
production costs, whereas the last term is the cost of setting up one additional rm.
With a CRS technology, the marginal cost of capital is equal to the average capital
cost, and the socially optimal number of rms depends only on the reduction in trans-
portation costs relative to the increase in xed costs. In this case, the rst-best number of
rms is given by nfbCRS =
p
=2f . If technology is IRS (g0 < ng), it follows from (25) that
the rst-best number of rms is lower than under a CRS technology, whereas if technol-
12The second-order condition requires
@2W
@n2
=   1
n3
( + rg00) < 0;
which is always fullled if g00  0. However, if g00 < 0, we need to assume that  >  rg00.
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ogy is DRS (g0 > ng), the rst-best number of rms is higher than with CRS technology.
Thus, we have the following ranking
nfbIRS < n
fb
CRS < n
fb
DRS:
This ranking is also intuitive because with IRS technology, each rm should produce
more output in order to exploit the scale properties so that overall production costs fall,
all else equal. However, with DRS technology, it is optimal with more rms that each
produces a lower volume.
5.2 Socially optimal corporate tax
In a second-best world, the number of rms is determined by the market equilibrium
dened by the zero-prot condition in (15). In this case, second-best welfare is simply
the sum of consumers' surplus and corporate tax income. Imposing symmetry, the second-
best social welfare simplies to the following
W sb = m+ v   
2n
  p + t (p   rgn) ; (26)
where p and n are given by (7) and (15), respectively. The rst four terms dene the
net consumers' surplus, whereas the last term is the corporate tax income net of the tax
deductions for capital costs.
The socially optimal corporate tax is given by the following rst-order condition
@W sb
@t
= p   nrg   (1  t) @p

@t
+


2 (n)2
+ tr

g0
1
n
  g

@n
@t
: (27)
The two rst terms dene the direct welfare eect of corporate taxation keeping prices
and the number of rms xed. The third term denes the negative welfare eect of higher
prices, whereas the last set of terms denes the indirect welfare eects on transport and
capital costs due to changes in market entry. As shown in Proposition 3, a higher cor-
porate tax reduces the number of rms (@n=@t < 0), and has therefore an adverse eect
on consumers' surplus, whereas the impact on capital costs depends on the production
technology and level of tax deductions.
Using the equilibrium price and market entry in (7) and (15), respectively, and the
comparative statics results in (18) and (16), the rst-order condition in (27) simplies to
@W sb
@t
=
[ + nr (g0   gn)] [ (1  2t)  2nrt (g0   gn)]
2n [2 (1  t) + r (1  t) g00] = 0;
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which yields the following socially optimal corporate tax
t =
1
2


 + rn (g0   ng)

> 0: (28)
From this expression, we obtain the following results:
Proposition 5 In a Salop model with free entry,
(i) there exists a strictly positive (and unique) corporate tax rate t dened by (28) that
implements rst-best entry
 
n = nfb

.
(ii) If t < (>) t, then the market equilibrium implies excessive (suboptimal) entry.
(iii) If capital cost deductions are not allowed (CBIT) and/or technology involves CRS,
the rst-best corporate tax rate is 1/2;
(iv) If capital cost deductions are allowed (ACE) and technology involves IRS (DRS),
the rst-best corporate tax rate is higher (lower) than 1/2.
In contrast to the optimal tax literature to date, Proposition 5 shows that a small
open economy under imperfect competition should levy a positive corporate (source) tax
on capital. In our setting, such a positive tax implies that the tax also falls on the normal
return on mobile capital. The benchmark result in the optimal tax literature is that a
small open economy should not apply a source-based tax on the normal rate of return on
mobile capital (see Gordon, 1986). Since capital is perfectly elastic, such a source-based
tax is fully shifted onto immobile factors of production via an outow of capital which
drives up the pre-tax return to capital. This result is recognized as an open-economy
version of Diamond and Mirrlees' (1971) production eciency theorem, but is derived
under the assumption of perfect competition. Under imperfect competition the welfare
maximization problem must balance the gains and costs of tougher competition and this
leads to a positive tax rate.
In our model a zero corporate tax would result in excessive entry. This result, which is
often referred to as the \excess entry theorem", is standard in spatial competition models
(e.g., Vickrey, 1964; Salop, 1979).13 The social planner equates the marginal benet to
consumers (reduction in transport costs) to the marginal costs (xed entry cost and
change in capital costs due to scale properties). Firms, on the other hand, consider the
protability of entry and do not internalize the negative impact of entry on rival rms'
prot through increased price competition. Since total demand is inelastic, competition
is purely business-stealing, which is the main reason for excessive entry (see, e.g., Gu
13Matsumura and Okamura (2006) show that this theorem holds for a large set of transportation costs
and production technologies. However, Gu and Wenzel (2009) relax the assumption of inelastic demand
and show that there is insucient entry if demand is suciently elastic.
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and Wenzel, 2009). From a social point of view, the marginal costs of entry exceeds the
marginal benet to consumers.
To summarize our results above, we nd that in markets with corporate taxation, rm
entry can be excessive or suboptimal depending on the level of the corporate tax. Since the
corporate tax directly reduces rms' prots, the incentive to enter the market is reduced.
The corporate tax mitigates market failure due to excessive entry, and transforms the
wasteful use of resources spent on market entry into tax revenues, which can be returned
to households via lump-sum transfers or by nancing a public good.14
Proposition 5 makes it clear that the tax authorities can always implement the rst-
best by selecting the appropriate corporate tax rate. The socially optimal tax rate is
exactly 1/2 if the technology is CRS. In this case, tax deductions for capital costs do not
inuence the market equilibrium (market entry). However, if technology is IRS or DRS,
then the choice of ACE or CBIT will inuence the market outcome and therefore also
the optimal corporate tax rate. More precisely, if technology is IRS, then the rst-best
number of rms is lower than under CRS. Consequently, the optimal corporate tax rate
is higher. The reverse is true when technology is DRS.
Note that positive corporate taxation is optimal for any kind of tax system, i.e., for
any level of . In a Salop world, welfare is fully determined by the competition intensity,
i.e., by the number of rms in the market. The government has two instruments, the tax
rate t and the share of capital cost that are tax deductible () to enforce the optimal
number of rms in the market. Because price eects are welfare-neutral redistributive
eects between consumers and producers in our imperfect-competition model, the choice
of the tax system (i.e., of ) does not provide any additional benets and we are left
with two instruments for adjusting one margin. The choice of  then is redundant as
soon as the optimal corporate tax rate is adjusted according to equation (28). Under
constant returns to scale, it is also important to note that corporate taxation is the only
instrument available as capital cost deductibility does not aect market entry anymore.
5.3 Socially optimal capital costs deductions
Usually the corporate tax rate is not set in order to induce the rst-best number of rms
across product markets. In this section, we therefore study the welfare eects of tax
deduction schemes assuming any given corporate tax t 2 (0; 1). Maximizing the second-
best social welfare function in (26) with respect to the level of tax deductions for capital
costs yields the following rst-order condition
@W sb
@
=  tnrg   @p

@
(1  t) +


2 (n)2
+ tr

g0
1
n
  g

@n
@
: (29)
14Note that equilibrium prots are zero due to free market entry. Therefore, our results are not driven
by the fact that economic rents should be taxed away in an optimal tax setting.
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The impact of capital cost tax deductions on social welfare consists of a direct eect
(rst two terms) and an indirect eect through the change in entry (last set of terms).
For a given number of rms, allowing for tax deductions reduces corporate tax income
both directly (tnrg) and through the price reduction (t  @p=@). However, the price
reduction benets consumers, implying that the net direct welfare eects of capital cost
tax deductions are a priori ambiguous.
The indirect welfare eects crucially relies on the impact of capital cost deductibility
on market entry. We showed in Proposition 3 that a higher level of deductions increases
(reduces) the number of rms in the market when technology is IRS (DRS), but has
no eect when technology is CRS. Thus, under CRS technology, the last term in (29)
disappears and we are left with the direct eect. However, with an IRS technology,
ACE will trigger more market entry. In this case, capital cost deductions have a positive
impact on consumers' surplus due to lower transport costs and lower prices, but a negative
impact on tax income through lower prices and higher average capital costs due to lower
production at each rm. The opposite is true for DRS technology or CBIT tax scheme.
Imputing the equilibrium values in (7) and (15) and the comparative statics in (19)
and (17), the rst-order condition simplies to
@W sb
@
=
rt (g0   gn)  
2
(1  2t)  tnr (g0   gn)
2 (1  t) + rg00 (1  t) = 0; (30)
which yields the following optimal tax deduction level for capital costs
 =
 (1  2t)
2nrt (g0   gn) : (31)
Based on these expressions, we get the following results:
Proposition 6 In a Salop model with free entry, we may state:
(i) If technology is CRS, the choice of tax scheme has no eect on welfare;
(ii) If technology is IRS, CBIT ( = 0) is socially optimal if t  1=2; ACE ( = 1)
is socially optimal if t > et, and an intermediate scheme (0 <  < 1) is socially optimal if
t 2  1=2;et;
(iii) If technology is DRS, CBIT is socially optimal if t  1=2; ACE is socially optimal
if t < et, and an intermediate scheme is socially optimal if t 2  et; 1=2;
where et = =2 ( + nr (g0   gn)) yields  = 1.
The proposition shows that the choice of tax scheme crucially relies on the production
technology and the competitive eects of ACE and CBIT. Under CRS technology, the
deductibility of capital costs (interest) has no impact on market entry (cf. Proposition 3),
and the choice of tax scheme is welfare neutral. However, under IRS technology, CBIT
is welfare improving if the corporate tax is suciently low. In this case, the number of
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rms in the market is too high, and full deductibility of capital costs (ACE) triggers even
more entry. Consequently, IRS technology and an ACE-system is only welfare improving
for high corporate tax levels when market entry is suboptimal. The opposite is true when
the technology is DRS.
5.4 Tax revenue neutrality
In this section, we analyze the welfare properties of ACE and CBIT when we require
that a tax reform (switching either to ACE or CBIT) must keep tax revenue unchanged.
Imposing symmetry, the corporate tax income in (23) simplies to15
T  = t (p   rgn) ; (32)
where the equilibrium price p and number of rms n are given by (7) and (15), respec-
tively. From this we can make two observations. First, for a given number of rms, capital
cost deductibility generates lower tax revenue due to the deductibility of interest and due
to lower prices and lower before-tax prots. The implication is a higher corporate tax
under ACE than CBIT. Second, for a given tax scheme, more rms in the market place
reduces tax income. Fiercer competition reduces prices and before-tax prots, which in
turn leads to lower tax revenue, all else equal. Thus, when CBIT triggers less entry
than ACE, the competition eect reinforces the direct eect, and ACE requires a higher
corporate tax to achieve tax income neutrality. When CBIT triggers more entry than
ACE, the competition eect counteracts the direct eect, and it is a priori unclear which
regime that requires a higher corporate tax to keep tax revenue unchanged. In order to
study this ambiguity further, we consider the eect of a change in the corporate tax and
 on the equilibrium corporate tax income. Dierentiating the tax revenue expression
(32) with respect to the corporate tax rate yields
@T 
@t
= p   rgn + t

@p
@t
+ r

g0
1
n
  g

@n
@t

> 0; (33)
where the rst two terms are the direct, positive eect of an increase in the corporate
tax, whereas the second set of terms are the indirect, competitive eect on prices and
capital costs due to changes in market entry. We know from Proposition 3 and 4 that a
higher corporate tax reduces market entry (@n=@t < 0) ; but increases equilibrium prices
(@p=@t > 0). From (33), it is then evident that corporate tax revenue is always increasing
in the corporate tax rate when technology is CRS or IRS. However, if technology is DRS,
fewer rms in the market means higher capital costs, which in turn increases capital
cost deductions. Notice that this eect vanish under CBIT since  = 0. This eect is a
15Notice that equilibrium tax income is always strictly positive as long as rms' equilibrium (before-
tax) prots are positive, which is ensured by the the equilibrium condition 2, as reported in Lemma 1.
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second-order eect, and we can show that it never osets the positive eect of an increase
in the corporate tax on total corporate tax income.16
What is the eect of tax deductions on tax income? Dierentiating (32) with respect
to  we get
@T 
@
=  trgn + t

@p
@
+ r

g0
1
n
  g

@n
@

< 0: (34)
The rst term reects the direct, negative eect of allowing for deductions for capital
costs. The second set of terms are the indirect eects on prices and capital costs due
to changes in market entry. We know from Proposition 4 that more tax deductions
induces lower equilibrium prices (@p=@ < 0). This eect reinforces the negative, direct
eect. The eect on market entry depends on technology. From Proposition 3, we
know that under CRS, tax deductions have no impact on market entry (@n=@t = 0). In
this case ACE will always generate lower tax income than CBIT. If technology is IRS
(g0 < ng), then tax deductions triggers market entry (@n=@ > 0), whereas the opposite
(@n=@ < 0) is true when technology is DRS (g0 > ng). This implies that the last term
in (34) is negative, which means that the competition eect always reinforces the direct,
negative eect of tax deductions on total corporate tax income. Based on (33) and (34),
we can make the following conclusion:
Lemma 2 In a Salop model with free entry and tax revenue neutrality, tax deductions
for capital costs lead to lower corporate tax income, and implies a higher corporate tax
under ACE than CBIT.
We now proceed with analyzing the welfare properties of ACE and CBIT under tax
income neutrality. This analysis is quite demanding since it involves comparing welfare
levels conditional on tax income being identical in the two schemes. Using (26), welfare
under CBIT ( = 0) and ACE ( = 1) are given by
W sbc = m+ v  

2nc
  pc (1  tc) ;
and
W sba = m+ v  

2na
  pa (1  ta)  targana;
where subscript a and c denote ACE and CBIT, respectively. Based on this, we can write
the welfare dierence as follows
W := W sbc  W sba =

2

1
na
  1
nc

+ pa (1  ta)  pc (1  tc) + targana;
where W > (<) 0 implies that CBIT (ACE) is socially desirable. We see that CBIT is
16See proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
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welfare improving unless ACE involves stronger competitive eects (more entry and lower
prices) simply because CBIT generates higher tax income by disallowing tax deductions
for capital costs. From Proposition 3, we know that ACE (CBIT) induces more entry
than CBIT (ACE) when technology is IRS (DRS), whereas with CRS technology entry
is unaected by tax deductions. Moreover, from Proposition 4, we know that ACE leads
to lower prices than CBIT. These results are derived assuming a constant corporate tax
rate. However, assuming tax income neutrality, the pro-competitive eects of ACE may
be oset by the higher corporate tax rate (ta > tc). Thus, the scope for CBIT to be
welfare improving increases under tax income neutrality due to the adverse eects of
corporate taxation on entry and pricing.
To illustrate the welfare properties of ACE and CBIT under tax income neutrality, we
construct numerical examples assuming the (inverse) production function relating capital
and output is given by k = g (y) = y. Below, we report two tables where we vary the
tax rate under CBIT from a low tax level (tc = 0:1) to a high tax level (tc = 0:5), and
compute the corresponding tax rate under ACE that generates the same tax income level
as with CBIT.
Table 1. Numerical results under tax income neutrality with low tax rate.
CRS ( = 1) DRS ( = 2) IRS ( = 0:5)
CBIT ACE CBIT ACE CBIT ACE
Tax rate 0:100 0:159 0:100 0:106 0:100 0:265
Entry 13 12 13 13 8 7
Price 0:265 0:267 0:171 0:169 0:407 0:418
Tax income 0:027 0:027 0:017 0:017 0:041 0:041
Welfare 3:685 3:677 3:769 3:771 3:509 3:480
Parameter values:  = 2; r = 0:1;m = v = 2; f = 0:01:
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Table 2. Numerical results under tax income neutrality with high tax rate.
CRS ( = 1) DRS ( = 2) IRS ( = 0:5)
CBIT ACE CBIT ACE CBIT ACE
Tax rate 0:500 0:700 0:500 0:514 0:500 0:780
Entry 10 7 10 9 5 4
Price 0:400 0:386 0:240 0:244 0:624 0:600
Tax income 0:200 0:200 0:120 0:120 0:312 0:312
Welfare 3:700 3:671 3:780 3:764 3:488 3:462
Parameter values:  = 2; r = 0:1;m = v = 2; f = 0:01:
For the low tax rate case in Table 1, we see that CBIT yields higher welfare than
ACE in case of CRS and IRS technology, whereas ACE yields higher welfare in case of
DRS. This is somewhat surprising since the pro-competitive eects of ACE are stronger
under IRS (cf. Proposition 3). However, the reason is that tax income neutrality requires
a large increase in the corporate tax rate under ACE when technology is IRS, and this
has adverse eects on entry and prices. Actually, it is only in the DRS case that prices
are lower and entry is at the same level under ACE. In this case, tax income neutrality
only requires a small increase in the corporate tax under ACE. In the case of CRS and
IRS, entry is higher, prices are lower and welfare is higher with CBIT.
For the high tax rate case in Table 2, we see that ACE is never welfare improving.
The reason is partly that rst-best is achieved under CBIT with a corporate tax rate
equal to one half, and partly that tax income neutrality leads to a corporate tax rate
under ACE above 1/2, which induces suboptimal entry. From Table 2, we also see that
entry is always higher under CBIT, whilst prices are lower under ACE and CRS/IRS
technology. These numerical examples illustrate that the welfare ranking of ACE and
CBIT is generally ambiguous, but that tax income neutrality is likely to make CBIT
preferable to ACE due to the adverse eects of corporate taxation on entry and prices.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper studies how the Corporate Business Income Tax (CBIT) and the Allowance
for Corporate Equity tax (ACE) perform under imperfect competition. When rms have
market power consumer surplus is positively aected by tougher competition whereas
prot and tax revenue may fall when competition intensies. We show in this paper
that the corporate tax plays a role in balancing gains to consumers against the costs of
competition, since a positive corporate tax reduces excessive market entry and wasteful
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use of resources. The welfare comparison between these two tax systems is ambiguous
and depends on assumptions about production technology, entry and the level of the
corporate tax rate. We show that CBIT may be the preferred choice if the economy to a
large extent is characterized by imperfect-competition between multinational rms. The
reason is that under IRS, capital cost tax deductions increases rms' prots, whereas the
strategic eect via price competition does not matter much. In support of this result
is a large literature suggesting that multinationals produce under IRS technology.17 In
general, it is unclear how important multinationals are in the economy and if there is a
tipping point. Thus, we cannot conclude in favor of CBIT or ACE.
Appendix: Proofs of Lemmata and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. The second-order condition
@2i
@p2i
=  1


2 (1  t) + r (1  t) g00 1


< 0
is always fullled if g00  0. However, if g00 < 0, then we need 2 (1  t)+r (1  t) g00 1

> 0,
which is always true if  > 1 dened in (9). In addition, for the price equilibrium in (7) to
exist, we need to ensure that the equilibrium prots in (8) is non-negative for any n  2.
Since equilibrium prots are monotonically increasing in  , i.e., @=@ = (1  t) =n2 > 0,
we can set  = 0 and solve for  , which yields the lower bound 2 dened in (10). Thus,
for any  > 2, equilibrium prots is strictly positive. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) From (13), we see that @=@t < 0 is always true if
 = 0 or g0  ng. On the other hand, if  > 0 and g0 < ng , then @=@t < 0 is true if
and only if  > n2r
 
g   g0 1
n

. Comparing this with the non-negative prot condition
in (10), it is easily veried that
2 :=
n2
1  t

r

g   g0 1
n

+ f

> n2r

g   g0 1
n

for all valid parameter values:
Thus, it follows that @=@t < 0 is always true. (ii) From (14), it follows that
@i
@
8><>:
> 0 if g0 < ng
= 0 if g0 = ng
< 0 if g0 > ng
:
QED.
17Theoretical contributions in support of IRS technology can be found in Helpman (1984) and Ethier
(1986), whereas Carr et al. (2001) and Antweiler and Treer (2002) are examples of a vast empirical
literature. Antweiler and Treer (2002) estimate that one third of all goods-producing industries are
characterized by IRS technology.
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Proof of Proposition 3. (i) The second-order condition in (9) ensures that the
denominator of (16) is strictly positive, and the non-negative prot constraint (10) ensures
that the numerator of (16) is strictly positive. Thus, @n=@t < 0 is always true. (ii) The
second-order condition in (9) ensures that the denominator of (17) is strictly positive.
Thus, the sign of (17) is determined by the sign of the numerator, which implies that
@n
@
8><>:
> 0 if g0 < ng
= 0 if g0 = ng
< 0 if g0 > ng
:
QED.
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Using the second-order condition in (9) and that
@n=@t < 0 from Proposition 3, it follows from (18) that @p=@t > 0 is always true. (ii) If
@n=@  0, which is the case when g0  ng (cf. Proposition 3), it follows from (19) that
@p=@ < 0 is always true by the second-order condition in (9). However, if @n=@ < 0,
which is the case if g0 > ng (cf. Proposition 3), then @p=@ is potentially ambiguous.
Inserting (17) into (19), and simplifying the expression, we get
@p
@
=  rt (1  t) (g
0 + ng) + gnrg00 (1  t)
(1  t) (2 (1  t) + rg00 (1  t)) :
It is straightforward to show that both the numerator and denominator are strictly pos-
itive using the equilibrium conditions in Lemma 1. Thus @p=@ < 0 is always true
irrespective of technology. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Observe from (28) that t > 0 is always true if g0  ng.
However, if g0 < ng, then t > 0 holds if only if  >. However, using the non-negative
prot condition in (10), it is easily veried that 2 > nr (ng   g0), which ensures that
t > 0 is true for all valid parameter values. Inserting (28) the zero-prot condition (15),
we get

2 (n)2
+ r

g0
1
n
  g

  f = 0;
which exactly coincide with the condition for the rst-best number of rms in (25).
(ii) Since @n=@t < 0 from (16), it follows that n < (>)nfb when t > (<) t:
(iii) It follows from (28) that t = 1=2 if technology is CRS (g0 = ng) and/or a CBIT
scheme ( = 0) is in place.
(iv) It follows from (28) that t > 1=2 with tax deductions ( > 0) and IRS technology
(g0 > ng), whereas the opposite is true with a DRS technology (g0 < ng).
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) With a CRS technology (g0 = ng), then (29) holds for
any  2 [0; 1].
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(ii) With a IRS technology (g0 < ng), from (31), we get
 =
8><>:
0 if t  1
2
(0; 1) if t 2  1
2
;et
1 if t  et ; where et >
1
2
:
(iii) With a DRS technology (g0 > ng), then from (31), we get
 =
8><>:
1 if t  et
(0; 1) if t 2  et; 1
2

0 if t > 1
2
; where et < 1
2
:
Proof of Lemma 2.
(i) Inserting the equilibrium price (7) into equation (23), we get
T = t


n
+ r

g0
1  t
1  t   gn

:
Dierentiating this expression with respect to t and collecting terms yields equation (33).
We have that @n=@t < 0 from Proposition 3 and @p=@t > 0 from Proposition 4. This
implies @T =@t > 0 , as given by (33), is always true when technology is CRS (g0 = ng)
or IRS (g0 < ng). If technology is DRS (g0 > ng), then still
@T 
@t
=

n
+ rg0
1  2t+ t2
(1  t)2   t


n2
+ rg00
1  t
1  t
1
n2
  r

g0
1
n
  g

@n
@t
> 0:
(ii) We have that @p=@ < 0 from Proposition 4 and that
@n
@
8><>:
> 0 if g0 < ng
= 0 if g0 = ng
< 0 if g0 > ng
;
from Proposition 3. From this, it follows that
@T 
@
=  trgn + t

@p
@
+ r

g0
1
n
  g

@n
@

< 0
must be true. QED.
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